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THE SUFFOCATION OF FREE SPEECH DUE TO THE
"GRAVITY OF DANGER" OF TERRORISM
By Tim Davis*
Ii al-Timimi ("al-Timimi"), a well respected, outspoken
Muslim scholar, in his fervent support of Muslims everywhere, has openly proclaimed that America is one of
the chief enemies of the Muslim populace. 1 He proclaimed that
the explosion of the space shuttle Columbia was a sign for Muslims to take action. 2 He urged young Muslim men to jihad, to
wage armed conflict with the enemies oflslam. 3
In 2004, the Federal government charged al-Timimi in a tencount indictment. 4 During his trial in April 2005, the prosecution
introduced over 250 evidentiary exhibits, 5 along with testimony
from expert witnesses on radical Islamism 6 and testimony from
various government agents. In addition, the prosecution introduced testimony from several co-conspirators convicted in an
earlier trial. 7 The co-conspirators were facing harsh sentences
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unless they cooperated
with the government. 8
Despite this mountain of evidence, probative evidence that
al-Timimi was actually involved in any illegal activity is quite
limited. In fact, the pivotal evidence against al-Timimi centers
on the corroborated testimony of co-conspirators testifying that
al-Timimi was present at a two-hour meeting at a coconspirator' s home on September 16, 2001, five days after the
tragedy of 9/11. 9 The testimony alleged that al-Timimi incited
the attendees to take up jihad along with the Taliban, even in the
likely event that the jihadists would engage in direct action with
American forces in Afghanistan. 10
On April 18, 2005, jury deliberations began, and buried in
nearly 200 pages of jury instructions, was a single paragraph that
unceremoniously described the law of protected speech under
Brandenburg v. Ohio. 11 After deliberating for seven days, the
jury returned a verdict of guilty on all ten counts. 12 Subsequently, al-Timimi was sentenced to life in prison plus 70
years. 13
The trial of United States of America v. Ali Al-Timimi14
raises a number of First Amendment issues. First, this Article
lays a foundation describing the facts of the Al-Timimi case and
the prior co-conspirator trial, United States v. Khan. 15 Next, the
Article explores the application of the First Amendment and discusses relevant cases, including United States v. Rahman, 16 a
case remarkably similar to Al-Timimi.
From this analysis, it is clear that courts have had difficulty
defining the line between protected advocacy and criminal
speech, including whether or how Brandenburg v. Ohio should
be applied. Moreover, in deciding between what constitutes advocacy and criminal speech, the courts have leaned towards
criminal speech when the solicited activity is sufficiently grave,
especially in the context of national security. Repeatedly, the
courts have demonstrated that there is an inverse relationship
between gravity of danger and freedom of speech; when the cirFall 2006

cumstances are sufficiently grave, free speech will be less tolerated.
Regardless of whether terrorism represents one of the gravest dangers this country has ever faced, it has led the government
to scale back fundamental constitutional rights with the enactment of the Patriot Act. Reminiscent of the prosecutions of alleged Communists amidst the hysteria of McCarthyism, the government has brought down swift and furious punishment upon
anyone even remotely connected to terrorism. In the final analysis, I assert that al-Timimi's two speeches in September and October of2001 should be considered protected speech, resulting in
the United States government having insufficient proof to sustain
the conviction. If al-Timimi were to lose his appeal, the fundamental constitutional right of free speech would be significantly
diminished. 38

Al-Timimi was born in 1963 in Washington, D.C. to Muslim
parents who worked in the Iraqi Embassy. 17 In 1978, his parents
moved to Saudi Arabia where he received instruction in the
Qur'an. From an early age, he was intrigued by the depiction of
Judgement Day in the Qur'an and started a lifelong inquiry of the
harbingers and omens of the approach of a foretold apocalypse.
At age 17, al-Timimi returned to a changed United States to
attend college, where he perceived a growing intolerance of
Muslims in the United States, which fueled his devotion to the
study oflslam. In 1987, while thousands of Muslims were pouring into Afghanistan to join the mujahideen, 18 he traveled to Medina, Saudi Arabia, to study at the college of Haddith. After his
return from Medina, al-Timimi started lecturing on various topics of Islam and became a well-respected lecturer in the global
Muslim community. He lectured at various conferences, particularly at those hosted by the Islamic Assembly of North America
("JANA"). He co-founded the Dar al-Arqam Center ("Center")
to provide English language instruction on Islam, and became a
frequent and popular speaker there. 19 In the aftermath of 9/11,
the FBI investigated organizations whose purpose was to incite
violent jihad and to recruit jihadists. 20 The Northern Virginia
investigations culminated in the arrest, trial, and conviction of alTimimi for advocating criminal activity.
On February 9, 2004, the government opened its case
against the "Virginiajihadnetwork"21 in United States v. Khan. 22
The network was charged with numerous, serious federal crimes
including conspiracy to contribute services to the Taliban and
other terrorist organizations, conspiracy to levy war against the
United States, and violation of the Neutrality Act. 23 The 11 defendants, including Masoud Ahmad Khan, Yong Ki Kwon, and
Muhammed Aatique, were regular attendees at the Center in
Falls Church, Virginia. 24
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In early January 2000, Kwon and Nabil Gharbieh, a Center
co-founder, decided that in order to prepare for jihad, they
would conduct military training by playing paintball. 25 Eventually all of the defendants played paintball with the express purpose of training for jihad. 26 Several defendants acquired weapons such as AK-47s and sniper rifles along with other less exotic
weapons. 27 Three of the defendants had traveled to Pakistan to
obtain military training at a camp run by Laskar-e-Taiba
("LET"), 28 an organization dedicated to violent jihad defending
the rights of Muslims in the disputed Kashmir region of India
and Pakistan. The United States designated LET as a foreign
terrorism organization ("FTO") in December of2001. 29
Two days after 9/11, al-Timimi asked Kwon "to organize a
plan in case of anti-Muslim backlash and to get the brothers together."30 Kwon and another defendant, Royer, made all of the
phone calls and set up the meeting for Sunday September 16,
2001 at Kwon's home. 31 At the meeting, it is alleged that alTimimi incited the group for violent jihad in support of the Taliban. In the next few days, four of the meeting attendees, Kwon,
Khan, Hasan, and Aatique, flew to Pakistan with the intention to
attend the LET camps. 32 Khan arranged his flight so he could
accompany Aatique on September 19, 2001, since Aatique already had a reservation on a flight to Pakistan for that day. 33
At another meeting in early October, 2001, al-Timimi allegedly exhorted five other members of the paintball group to take
up jihad in support of the Taliban. 34 Within days of the second
meeting, one defendant left for the LET camps in Pakistan and
another simply left the country. 35 The LET camp trainees took
part in various weapons training including automatic weapons,
grenades, RPGs, and anti-aircraft guns. 36 However, after the
start of open hostilities against the Taliban on October 20 2001
the Pakistanis closed their border with Afghanistan. 37 ~ addi~
tion, the Pakistani government was actively evicting foreign
fighters from the camps. 38 Consequently, the defendants still at
the camps, Khan, Hasan, and Kwon, learned that LET would no
longer facilitate their travel to Afghanistan. 39 Instead, Khan and
Hasan returned to the United States and Kwon remained in Pakistan to start a mango export business. 40
Six of the defendants agreed to plea bargain deals before
trial requiring that they cooperate with the government and testify against the other co-defendants. Of the five remaining defendants that stood trial, all but one of them were found guilty. 41
In a separate trial, another alleged coconspirator, Sabri Benkhala, was acquitted of all charges. 42

In April 2005, al-Timimi was charged with inciting and/or
aiding and abetting the "network" to commit their crimes. 43 The
government's primary contention was that al-Timimi, through
his lectures and direct personal appeals, induced and/or aided
and abetted members of the Virginia jihad network to leave the
country and pursue jihad training with the intent to defend the
4

Taliban against all potential enemies, including the United
States. 44 A key element of the prosecution's case was that alTimimi was the ringleader of the Virginia jihad network.
Al-Timimi was described as a well respected lecturer at the
Center, whom many attendees asked for advice on a wide variety of Islamic matters, including minor, almost trivial matters
such as whether one can pray in a moving car or whether one
may shorten prayers upon the discovery of a scorpion. 45 On
several occasions the paintball group asked al-Timimi's advice
on the matters pertaining to paintball. Through an intermediary,
Kwon asked al-Timimi what he thought of the paintball, to
which al-Timimi said, "That is something good that the brothers
can do." 46 In September 2000, FBI agents questioned one defendant about his paintball activities. 47 The defendant related
that al-Timimi said to continue playing paintball, because stopping will look more suspicious, but to be more discrete in the
future. 48 Soon afterward, the paintball group discontinued playing at local public courses and moved their activities to a private
farmland in Spotsylvania County. 49
On September 11, 2001, al-Timimi was supposed to attend
.
. a lecture. 50 However, when the group met for
a dmner an d give
dinner, they cancelled the lecture in light of the tragic events of
that day. The government contended that at the dinner alTimimi expressed his approval of the attacks and sought justification for the attacks. 51 In the Khan trial, two witnesses testified
that al-Timimi said the attacks were not Islamically justifiable,
but that United States' foreign policy had precipitated the attacks.52 The government's one witness to the contrary Hasan
was discredited in cross-examination with his inconsiste~t gran~
jury testimony. 53
Two days after 9/11, al-Timimi asked Kwon "to organize a
plan in case of anti-Muslim backlash and to get the brothers together."54 On September 16, 2001, al-Timimi attended the
meeting at Kwon's home. 55 When al-Timimi arrived he told the
group to turn off their phones, unplug the answering machine,
and pull down the curtains. 56 Al-Timimi then told them that this
meeting was amana, trust, which meant that the attendees were
not to talk about the meeting. 57 During the trial, the government
wanted to introduce evidence that at this meeting al-Timimi discussed Afghanistan because Mullah Omar, the leader of the
Taliban, had called for Muslims from all parts of the world to
defend the Taliban against imminent attack. 58 The defense
counsel successfully blocked the government from introducing
th at ev1'd ence. 59 Even t hough the government could not allege
that al-Timimi was attempting to recruit jihad fighters for the
Taliban, other evidence supports a conclusion that Afghanistan
was a topic of discussion by the group that night. 60
Later, at the same meeting, al-Timimi read parts of the alUqla fatwa opinion to the group and gave the fatwa to Khan
with the instructions to burn it after he had read it. 61 (Al-Timimi
told the group that they must join the mujahideen and that it did
not matter who they fought, Indians, Russians, or Americans.) 62
Al-Timimi said that the duty to take up jihad is Jard ayn, obligatory to all Muslims. 63 Al-Timimi offered the group several
THE MODERN AMERICAN

choices: (1) to take up jihad and defend the Muslims in Afghanistan; (2) to go and make hijra, leave the United States to avoid
supporting the government by paying taxes; or (3) to lay like a
rug in your house. 64 Three days later, on September 19, Aatique
and Khan flew to Pakistan and eventually made their way to the
LET camps for military training. 65 The next day, Kwon and
Hasan followed suit. 66
One month later, in early to mid-October, another meeting
was convened. 67 Al-Timimi told this group the same information he told the group on September 16. 68 In response, one defendant immediately quit his job,
flew to Pakistan, and proceeded
to the LET camp to receive jihad
training. 69 Another defendant,
who had a family and did not
wish to fight, simply left the
country (hijra). 70
Additionally, at trial the
government introduced numerous speeches given by alTimimi. One of the most controversial speeches introduced was
the "Space Shuttle" speech, delivered shortly after the space
shuttle Columbia exploded upon reentry into the earth's atmosphere on February I, 2003. 71 In it, al-Timimi proclaimed that
"[t]here is no doubt that Muslims were overjoyed because of the
adversity that befell their greatest enemy." 72 Always interested
in omens, al-Timimi then described the numerous omens evoked
by space shuttle explosion that foretold the impending doom of
the United States. 73 In another speech entitled World Advice to
the Salajis, al-Timimi said, "wagingjihad in the path of Allah is
an unceasing obligatory duty until the Day of Judgment, not to
be forsaken because of the lack of a khalifa." 74

A P ICAB E LAW (;:QVE °'lt,,8 A •VOC:AC:v Ci
I L CA Ac-1v 1v
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Initially, it is worth noting that cases concerning advocacy
of illegal activity are relatively rare. Consequently, advocacy of
illegal activity cases appear for a time and then disappear for
many years, paralleling the wax and wane of the political movements that give rise to the activity. The first political movement
that advocated illegal activity was the Socialist movement in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, followed by the
Communist movement after World War II. Today, we are potentially engaged in the third act of advocacy cases, those concerning Islamic activism.
The first advocacy cases were almost exclusively confined
to the prosecution of members of the socialist party in and
around the First World War. 75 Most, if not all of the activities
for which Socialists were prosecuted at that time, would be permissible today. 76
Ironically, our discussion of al-Timimi starts with Schenck
v. United States. 77 While al-Timimi was convicted of speech
that incited young Muslim men to participate in armed contlict,78 Schenck was convicted of pamphleteering to dissuade
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young men from enlisting in the armed services during World
War 1. 79 In Schenck, the Court refused to apply First Amendment protection to Schenck's speech, stating that, "the character
of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done"
and on the "proximity and degree." 80 Accordingly, the court set
down the "clear and present danger" test that would endure for
almost 40 years. Advocacy of illegal activity would be protected unless the "words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent." 81 The time
frame for the actual danger in
Schenck, that someone would read
the pamphlet and decide not to
enlist, was anywhere from imminent to several months or years.
This rule effectively gave the government broad discretion to prosecute speculatively dangerous
speech.
After advocacy of illegal action speech had laid dormant for
30 years, four important cases arose from the Communist era in
the United States: Dennis v. United States, 82 Yates v. United
States, 83 Scales v. United States, 84 and Noto v. United States. 85
These cases mark the first time the Supreme Court was willing
to give advocacy of illegal acts First Amendment protection,
reversing the holdings in the Socialist cases. The Supreme
Court defined numerous examples of protected and nonprotected activity in these cases, including requisite evidence.
Decided during the heyday of McCarthyism, the Court in
Dennis upheld the convictions against all of the defendants for
violations of the Smith Act. 86 The Court was concerned that the
Communists would use the freedom of speech to destroy liberty.
Thus, with this fear in mind, the Supreme Court sidestepped the
"clear and present danger" test and adopted the test advanced by
Chief Judge Learned Hand who wrote for the lower court. 87
Judge Hand wrote, "in each case [courts] must ask whether the
gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."88 Once the court concluded that the danger was sufficient,
the invasion of free speech was permissible. 89
Yates was decided in 1957, several years after public support for Senator Joseph McCarthy had withered, thus allowing
the Court to decide an advocacy case without the threat of a
public backlash fueled by hysteria. In Yates, the court emphasized the distinction between "advocacy in the realm of ideas"
and the "advocacy of action." 90 "The essential distinction is that
the advocate must be urging his or her audience to do something, now or in the future, rather than merely to believe in
something."91 Therefore, abstract advocacy divorced from action would not be punished, 92 while advocacy meant to instigate
action, coupled with evil intent, was punishable. 93 Similarly,
Scales and Noto were decided on the same day in 1960 and
stand for the same proposition; mere membership alone in an
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organization that advocates the violent overthrow of the government cannot be prosecuted. 94 However, "active" participation,
unlike "nominal" membership, could be punished. 95

In 1969, the Court decided Brandenburg, now the seminal
case for advocacy of illegal activity. Although the opinion addressed many of the loose ends left dangling from the Communist party advocacy cases, Brandenburg's holding and application is still hotly debated today. If nothing else, Brandenburg
finally overruled the "clear and present danger" test. In Brandenburg, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan group was convicted of
advocating unlawful action during two separate rallies where he
exhorted attendees to commit violence. 96 In striking down
Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act, the Court declared:
The constitutional guarantees of free speech and
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action. 97
In the wake of Brandenburg, the line between mere advocacy and advocacy to action is not always clear. Rather than
struggle over this distinction, some courts merely declare that
the speech concerned is not advocacy and therefore is not protected.98 However, a common thread does run through all of
these advocacy cases: the more the speech moves away from the
ethereal world of ideas toward the concrete world of action, the
more likely the speech is unprotected by the First Amendment. An
equally important corollary is the
more imminent or apparent the danger is, the less likely the speech that
instigated the danger is protected.
Consistent with this proposition, it is
worth noting that Brandenburg did
not explicitly overrule Dennis or Yates and courts are free to
weigh the "gravity" of the danger to facilitate the desired outcome.99 Adding to this confusion is the fact that there have been
various interpretations of what "imminent" means.
The seminal case on the interpretation of Brandenburg's
"imminent" requirement is Hess v. lndiana. 100 In Hess, the defendant was participating in an antiwar demonstration on the
campus of Indiana University. 101 In an effort to retain some
control over the demonstration, police officers moved the demonstrators off the street onto the sidewalks. 102 It was then that
the defendant uttered, "We'll take the fucking streets later." 103
He was promptly arrested for disorderly conduct. 104 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction holding that "the statement
amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at
some indefinite future time." 105 Here, the Court clarified the
Brandenburg test by stipulating that "imminent" means "now"
or "immediately." Most courts adhere to the Hess Court's narrow interpretation of the Brandenburg test, 106 though in People
6

v. Rubin,1° 7 the court held that five weeks constituted imminent
danger. 108
Additionally, as a practical matter, the more specific the
speech, the more likely the speech is unprotected. In Brandenburg, Brandenburg said, "Bury the [blacks]." 109 Yet, suppose
Brandenburg had said, "See that black man over there, go bury
him!" In that instance, the speech is advocacy to action and is
very close to incitement or solicitation of murder. Though one
might think that the "imminency" requirement of Brandenburg
would limit the speaker's criminal liability, the specificity of the
incitement permits the courts to label the speech "nonadvocacy" and ignore Brandenburg altogether. At this point,
the courts turn to evidence of the intent of the speaker and weigh
the gravity of the "advocacy to action."

Omar Ahmad Ali Abdel Rahman was tried and convicted
for seditious conspiracy, conspiracy and solicitation to the murder of Egyptian President Mubarak, soliciting an attack on
American military installations, and bombing conspiracy. 110
Rahman, otherwise known as the "blind sheik," was indeed
blind and could only participate in those acts through speech.
The government contended that Rahman generally remained at a
level above the details of the individual operations, or in other
words, he was the ringleader. 111 In Rahman, the government
introduced speeches previously delivered by the defendant
where he instructed his followers to "do jihad with the sword,
with the cannon, with grenades, with the missile ... against
God's enemies." 112
The crucial
evidence proffered by the government was a number of Rahman's
conversations taped by law enforcement agencies. 113
The Rahman case is quite similar
to the al-Timimi case in that in each
case, a Muslim cleric or scholar was
prosecuted for soliciting, counseling, aiding, and abetting acts of
terrorism. Each of the men were adherents to a fundamental
strain of Islam that not only advocated jihad, but believed that
jihad was obligatory .114 In each case, the government introduced the defendant's public speeches to demonstrate motive.
However, the similarities end there. Rahman had attained the
level of Grand Mufti, able to render fatwa opinions; al-Timimi
had not. Rahman authorized all of his directives by issuing the
requisite fatawa, 115 whereas al-Timimi had to rely on other Muslim scholars for religious rulings. Rahman was in constant communication with his co-conspirators, giving them direction at
every turn. 116 Al-Timimi was a distant observer of the Khan
defendants and hardly knew them. 117 Rahman had an agenda of
terrorism, 118 in contrast to al-Timimi who was simply giving
guidance to his followers. Despite these differences, the government used the Rahman trial as a template to prosecute alTimimi.
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There are a number of factors present in the Al-Timimi case
that tend to move al-Timimi' s speech toward the protected
sphere of Brandenburg.

The allegation that al-Timimi was the Virginia jihad network ringleader was a crucial part of the government's case visa-vis the First Amendment. Yet, just as the defendant in Brandenburg disassociated from the attendees at the KKK rally, alTimimi advocated at a distance from his co-defendants.
No evidence exists that al-Timimi was the Virginia jihad
network ringleader. The prosecutor elicited testimony from the
Khan defendants that al-Timimi was well respected and answered many of their questions concerning Islam. However, alTimimi was not a Grand Mufti and he had to rely on other more
established Muslim scholars for their fatawa. Al-Timimi merely
relayed these fatawa to all members of the Center. In fact, the
government pointed out the fact that al-Timimi brought the alUqla fatwa to the September 16 meeting at Kwon's house. 119
Testimony was introduced that al-Timimi gave the written fatwa
to Masoud Khan with the instructions to burn it after reading
it. 120 Rather than supporting the prosecution's allegations that
al-Timimi was a ringleader, this incident demonstrates that alTimimi was obligated to follow the Islamic rulings of other clerics. Instead of being a ringleader, al-Timimi was a low-ranking
Muslim scholar who acted as a messenger between other muftis
and the Muslims at the Center.

The is little doubt that al-Timimi gave the Khan defendants
a wide variety of advice on Islamic matters. Moreover, there is
no reason to doubt the testimony of Kwon and Hasan, both of
whom corroborated the fact that al-Timimi gave them information specifically intended to facilitate their criminal objective travel to Pakistan. The problem is that everything al-Timimi
said to them was information that anybody could have given
them. 121 Additionally, aiding and abetting can take the form of
"steeling [one] to such action," 122 and a case can be made that
al-Timimi did in fact steel some of the Khan defendants to action. After the September 16 meeting, Kwon and Hasan immediately purchased airline tickets to travel to Pakistan on September 20. 123 Al-Timimi met with Kwon and Hasan on September
19 for lunch. 124 It is alleged that al-Timimi discussed their plans
and gave them more advice. 125
Admittedly, this meeting
smacks of"steeling [a group] to such action." However, rarely
in this country's history has a defendant been prosecuted for
merely steeling one to an action that they have already decided
to do.

Solicitation can only happen before the recipient-doer has
formed the intent to commit the crime. 126 This is especially important for al-Timimi's case because if the Khan defendants
Fall 2006

formed the intent to travel to the LET camps prior to the September 16 meeting, then al-Timimi cannot be legally prosecuted
for incitement, which is criminalized as solicitation. There are
several factors that could support this conclusion: several of the
Khan defendants had already traveled to the LET camps and
there has been no assertion that they were prompted by alTimimi; the hostile reaction to the Muslim community after
9/11; 127 and the fact that several of the Khan defendants had
already purchased cold weather camouflage jackets from Cabela's before the September 16 meeting. 128 If so, then alTimimi's speech merely added to their resolve, it did not precipitate it.
While al-Timimi is undoubtedly a devout adherent to his
faith who fully expected that his advice be followed, al-Timimi
had no personal stake in the Khan defendants' endeavors to take
up jihad. Furthermore, al-Timimi rarely provided specific details about the manner in which someone might follow his advice. While Rahman exhorted specific acts from his followers,
such as executing Egyptiona President Mubarak and bombing
the United Nations building, 129 al-Timimi in a more general
way, advised the Khan defendants to take up the defense of
Muslims, regardless of who was oppressor. 130
If the Khan defendants did indeed form the intent to take
jihad before the September 16 meeting, then al-Timimi could be
convicted based on "steeling" 131 them to action at the meeting
itself. However, al-Timimi did not engage in any instructional
speech that could constitute overt physical acts of aiding and
abetting the Khan defendants. Furthermore, as stated earlier,
there is scant authority for the proposition that someone can be
punished solely on the basis of"steeling" speech.

Imminent lawless action under Brandenburg evolved with
the realization that anyone can be incited to lawless action in the
heat of the moment. While it may be conceded that al-Timimi
did in fact exert significant influence over the Khan defendants,
in a two-hour meeting, al-Timimi likely did not exert sufficient
influence over these men to have them abandon their lives here
in the United States, travel to foreign lands, wait for several
weeks in a foreign land, obtain military training for another several weeks, and then potentially sacrifice their lives waging jihad. Kwon testified that he and Hasan spent the first two weeks
in Pakistan at Hasan's uncle's house where they passed the time
by shopping and taking in the sights. 132 Clearly their actions
were far from imminent.

When the United States began to zealously prosecute terrorists after 9/11, instead of success, the government encountered
numerous problems prosecuting terrorists. Against this backdrop, the trials of Khan and Al-Timimi unfolded. Emboldened
by its success in the Khan trial, the government went after the
Khan defendant's spiritual leader, al-Timimi. With their full
might, the FBI and the Department of Justice rapidly descended
7

upon al-Timimi. The lead prosecutor used every opportunity to
portray al-Timimi as a religious zealot with links to terrorism
who ordered his mindless devotees to take up jihad against
United States soldiers.
The facts speak for themselves. Al-Timimi was not the
Virginia jihad network ringleader, but rather a revered Muslim
scholar at the Center, who counseled on Islamic matters. Before
9/11, the Khan defendants readied themselves for jihad by playing paintball, while two of the Khan defendants bolstered their
skills by traveling to Pakistan and training with live weapons at
terrorist camps. These men may have gotten the idea of jihad
from al-Timimi, but they decided to prepare for jihad on their
own. After 9/11, the Khan defendants were primed and ready.
At the September 16, 200 I, meeting, had al-Timimi stated that
wagingjihadwas not Islamically permissible, likely none of the
Khan defendants would have proceeded. Yet, the tenor of alTimimi' s speeches on jihad was consistent: he believed that
jihad was fard ayn. That message did not suddenly change after
9/11. Furthermore, it was al-Timimi's position that the Qur'an
made no exceptions for the United States.

This was a close case. The jury deliberated for seven days,
but there was little chance they would be able to comprehend
and apply Brandenburg correctly, given the hot debate among
learned legal scholars. Yet, there are a number of factors that
should have categorized al-Timimi's speech as protected under
Brandenburg. Al-Timimi usually spoke in generalities, he gave
the Khan defendants choices regarding jihad, and he merely
answered questions about Islamic permissibility. Al-Timimi
advocated ideas based on his religious beliefs, regardless of
whether his speech was likely to prompt action. Furthermore,
each of the Khan defendants waited weeks before they actually
participated in terrorist camp training, indicating the lack of imminence. Yet, these vital facts to this case become negligible if
the courts simply declare that al-Timimi's speeches are not advocacy and therefore Brandenburg does not apply. There is
nothing to stop this course of action. If this occurs, the First
Amendment protection of free speech will be derogated.

* Tim Davis is a third-year law student at American University, Washington
College of Law. He earned a B.S. in Electrial Engineering from the University
of Maryland.
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